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Abstract
An unsymmetrical quantum key distribution scheme is proposed, its security is guaranteed by the correlation
of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger triplet state. In the proposed protocol, the distribution of quantum states
are unsymmetrical. This unsymmetrical characteristic makes the transmission qubits (except the loss qubits)
be useful. Sequentially the proposed protocol has excellent efficiency and security which are very useful in the
practical application.
PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution is defined as a procedure allowing two (multi-) legitimate
users of communication channel to establish two (multi-) exact copies, one copy for each
user, of a random and secret sequence of bits. It employs quantum phenomena such as
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the quantum corrections to protect distributions
of cryptographic keys. Since the BB84 protocol was presented, lots of quantum key dis-
tribution protocols for two communicators have been proposed. Three main protocols are
the BB84 protocol [1], B92 protocol [2] and the EPR protocol [3,4]. All these presented
quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks [5-
9], in that, as a matter of fundamental principle, the secret data can not be compromised
unknowingly to the legitimate users of the channel. Currently, the quantum key distribu-
tion has entered the experimental phases. The first quantum key distribution prototype,
working over a distance of 32 centimeters in 1989, was implemented by means of laser
transmitting in free space [9]. Soon, experimental demonstrations by optical fibber were
set up [10]. Recently, the transmission distance is extended to more than 30Km in the
fiber [11] and 205m in the free space [12].
The first quantum key distribution scheme, i.e., the Bennett Brassard (BB84) scheme,
was presented a decade ago. It is implemented by the four states {| ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ր〉, | ց〉},
where any of the two states {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} and any of the two states {| ր〉, | ց〉} are non-
commuted. Its security relies on the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. The
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security guarantee is derived from the fact that each bit of data is encoded at random
on either one of a conjugate pair of observables of quantum-mechanical object. Because
such a pair of observables is subjected to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, measur-
ing one of the observables necessarily randomizes the other. In 1992, Bennett devised
another protocol, i.e., the B92 protocol. It is based on the transmission of nonorthogo-
nal quantum states. This protocol uses any two nonorthogonal states to implement the
quantum key distribution. Its security relies on the non-distinguishability of unknown
two-nonorthogonal states.
Recently another quantum key distribution scheme, based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) [13] correlations, was suggested by Ekert and modified by Bennett, Brassard, and
Mermin. In the Ekert’s vision, it uses the EPR pair to distribute the quantum crypto-
graphic key, and uses the violation of the Bell inequalities to provide the secret security.
In the Bennett, Bassard and Mermin’s revised vision, they use the EPR pair to distribute
the quantum cryptographic key, but use the EPR correlation to provide the secret se-
curity. We describe here the modified version. In this scheme the communicator, called
Alice, creats pairs of spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state, and sends the communicator,
called Bob, one particle from each pair. When the two particles are measured separately
the results obtained for them are correlated. Using the correlation Alice and Bob can
check the eavesdropping and obtain the sharing key.
In this letter, we present another method in which the communicators use the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [14] to distribute the quantum cryptographic key and use
the correlations of the GHZ triplet state to provide the secret security. In this scheme
two particles of the GHZ triplet state are distributed to Alice and the third particle of
GHZ triplet state is distributed to Bob. Obviously, the distribution of the particles and
the quamtum states are unsymmetrical in the proposed protocol, which is different from
the previous schemes in which Alice and Bob the same numbers particles or quantum
states. This unsymmetrical characteristic brings some merits than the previous protocol,
for example the efficiency approaches 100% and the security is more higher, these charac-
teristics are very useful in the practical application. In the proposed protocol we let Alice
or the quantum source create a sequence of GHZ triplet states, and send one particle
from each triplet state to Bob. When three particles are measured the results obtained
for them are correlated. By using the correlation of the GHZ triplet state Alice and Bob
can check the eavesdropping and obtain the sharing key.
Before describing our protocol, we first investigate the correlation of the GHZ triplet
state. In general, A N-particle entanglement states may be written as
|ψ〉 =
N∏
i=1
|ui〉 ±
N∏
i=1
|uc
i
〉, (1)
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where ui stand for a binary variable, ui ∈ {|z+〉, |z−〉} and uci = 1 − ui, |z+〉 and
|z−〉 denote the spin eigenstates, or equivalently the horizontal and vertical polarization
eigenstates, or equivalently any two-level system. For N = 2 they reduce to the Bell
states and N = 3 and N = 4 they represent the GHZ states. For a general N we shall
calling them cat states. In this paper, we are interesting in the case of N = 3, i.e., the
GHZ triplet state.
In Eq.(1) for N = 3 they reduce to eight GHZ triplet states, we here use the following
state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|z + z + z+〉+ |z − z − z−〉). (2)
Define the x and y eigenstates
|x+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉+ |z−〉), (3)
|x−〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉 − |z−〉), (4)
|y+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉+ i|z−〉), (5)
|y−〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉 − i|z−〉), (6)
the GHZ triplet state can be rewritten as
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|x+〉|x+〉+ |x−〉|x−〉)|x+〉
+(|x+〉|x−〉+ |x−〉|x+〉)|x−〉],
(7)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|y+〉|y−〉+ |y−〉|y+〉)|x+〉
+(|x+〉|x−〉+ |x−〉|x+〉)|x−〉],
(8)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|y+〉|x−〉+ |y−〉|x−〉)|y+〉
+(|y+〉|x+〉+ |y−〉|x−〉)|y−〉],
(9)
or
|ψ〉 = 1
2
[(|x+〉|y−〉+ |x−〉|y+〉)|y+〉
+(|x+〉|y+〉+ |x−〉|y−〉)|y−〉].
(10)
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The above decomposition demonstrates the correlation among three particles. For ex-
ample, in Eq.(7) if one particle is in the state |x+〉 and the second particle is in the
state |x+〉, the third particle must be in the state |x+〉 because of the correlation of the
GHZ triplet state. By Eqs.(7-10), one may construct a lock-up table to summarize these
properties of GHZ states.
Table I. The correlation results of the GHZ triplet states
Particle 1 |x+〉 |x−〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
Particle 2 |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉 |x+〉
Particle 3 |x+〉 |x−〉 |y−〉 |y+〉
Particle 2 |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Particle 3 |x−〉 |x+〉 |y+〉 |y−〉
Particle 2 |y+〉 |y+〉 |y+〉 |y+〉
Particle 3 |y−〉 |y+〉 |x−〉 |x−〉
Particle 2 |y−〉 |y−〉 |y−〉 |y−〉
Particle 3 |y+〉 |y−〉 |x+〉 |x−〉
In any column of the table I we assume the result of particle 1 to be determined, and
consider the possible results of particles 2 and 3. The table I shows two properties of the
GHZ triplet state: i) By the result of any of the three particles, one can determine whether
the other two results of the particles are the same or not and also that he (she) will gain
no knowledge of what their results actually are, if he (she) knows what measurements
have been made for the other two particles (that is x or y). ii) From table I it is clear
that allows two parties jointly, but only jointly, to determine which was the measurement
outcome of the third party. So if the measurement directions of the three participators
are public, the combined results of any two participators can determine what the result
of the third party’s measurement was.
As discussed above, the GHZ state has a correlation properties that if only one particle
has been measured, the states of the other two particles are still not determined. This
property may be used in the quantum key distribution scheme. Let us now show how to
implement the quantum key distribution scheme by the GHZ state. Suppose Alice have
two particles denoted by P1, P3, and Bob have one particle denoted by P2 from the GHZ
triplet state. The protocol goes as follows.
1. Alice makes a random measurement on her one particle (e.g., P1) of two GHZ par-
ticles, either in the x or y direction.
2. Bob makes a random measurement on his GHZ particle P2, either in the x or y
direction.
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3. Bob sends his measurement bases x or y to Alice, but not the qubit values.
4. Alice measures his particle P3 according to the measurement bases of the particles P1
and P2.
5. Check eavesdropping by using the correlation of the GHZ triplet state.
6. Alice judges the Bob’s result by the results of the particles P1, P3 according to table
I, and transfers her results to be consistent with Bob’s results.
7. Alice and Bob obtain a sharing key by using the data sifting, the error correction and
privacy amplification technologies.
Let us now explain the above protocol in detail. In our protocol the sequence of the
GHZ triplet states may be generated by one communicator, e.g. Alice or by a quantum
source. For each GHZ triplet we let Alice have two particles and Bob have one particle
from the GHZ triplet. The roles of the Alice’s two particles are different: one is for the
key and another is for setting up the correlation of the GHZ triplet. In steps 1 Alice only
measures one of two GHZ particles, the result of this particle will be used for the quantum
cryptographic key. The another particle will be measured in step 4. This particle is used
to judge the Bob’s result. In additional, by making use of the particle P3 Alice and Bob
do not need to discard the sent quantum bits (qubits) that have been always discarded
in all the previous protocols. This is the superiority of our protocol.
In step 4 Alice’s measurement on particle P3 must base on the measurement bases of
the particles P1 and P2. The reason is that after Alice and Bob measure respectively
their particles P1 and P2, the state of the particle P3 is determined by the correlation
of the GHZ triplet state. If both Alice and Bob measure their particles (P1, P2) using
the same measurement bases, i.e., x or y direction, Alice measures her particle P3 along
the x direction, otherwise, Alice measures her particle using the y measurement basis.
After measure Alice gains the result of the particle P3, which is any of the four states
{|x+〉, |x−〉, |y+〉, |y−〉}.
Alice and Bob check the eavesdropping by using the correlation of the GHZ triplet
state. If the results of the particles P1, P2, P3 satisfy any of the Eqs.(7-10), which means
the results are in the table I with the correlation of the GHZ triplet state, we say the
correlations among three particles are perfect. After transmission, Alice and Bob publicly
compare the results of the GHZ triplet states on a sufficiently large random subset of the
set of all GHZ triplets. If they find that the test subset is indeed perfectly correlated, they
can refer that the remaining untested subset is also perfectly correlated, and therefore may
be used for the quantum cryptographic key. The method is as follows: Bob send publicly
Alice a random sub-sequence of his results, Alice compares the Bob’s results with her
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corresponding results. If the correlations of their results may be found in the table I, the
correlation is perfect, otherwise it means the eavesdropping. For example, if the results
of the particles P1, P2, P3 are respectively the |x+〉, |x−〉, |x−〉, the results are perfect, if
the results of the particles P1, P2, P3 are respectively the |x−〉, |x−〉, |x−〉, Bob’s particle
must be eavesdropped by the eavesdropper or be disturbed by the noise.
It needs to stress that Alice’s results must be consistent with Bob’s results for getting
the raw quantum key. In step 6, Alice can judge Bob’s results by the results of the particles
P1 and P3, but Bob gains no knowledge on Alice’s results, because Bob only has one result
of the GHZ triplet state. In addition, from table I we see the most correlation results of
particles P1, P2, P3 are different. For example when Alice’s results of two particles P1, P3
are |x−〉 and |x−〉, according to table I the Bob’s result should be |x+〉, obviously, the
results of the particles P1 and P2 are different. For obtaining a same key, Alice’s results
need to be consistent with Bob’s results. We may use two methods to gain the same key.
One is that Alice changes her qubits according to Bob’s results. Another is that Alice
transfers her qubits to binary bits according to Bob’s results. For example, assume Bob
transfers his qubits using the aforehand appointment |x+〉, |y+〉 → 0, |x−〉, |y−〉 → 1, if
Bob’s result is |y+〉 and Alice’s result is |x−〉, both Alice and Bob transfer their qubits to
binary bits 0. This way is different from the previous protocols, in which Alice and Bob
have a same aforehand appointment.
As the previous protocols the raw quantum key distribution is useless in practice be-
cause limited eavesdropping may be undetectable, yet it may leak some information, and
errors are to be expected even in the absence of eavesdropping. For these reasons, our
scheme needs to supplement some classical tools such as privacy amplification, error cor-
rection and data sifting, so we add the step 7 in our protocol. The implementation of
these supplemented classic tools are the same as in the previous documents [9].
The important point is that the efficiency of the quantum key distribution has been
improved in this protocol. Because Alice and Bob randomly measure their particles P1
and P2 before the Alice’s measurement on the particle P3, and Alice can measure the
particle P3 according to the measurement bases of the particles P1, P2, no Bob’s qubits
need to be discard in the proposed scheme. This way largely improves the efficiency of
the distribution for cryptographic key. Consider the quantum cryptographic system will
not be perfect because of the losing qubits (l) in the measurement and in the quantum
channel, in order to be left with a key of L qubits Alice should send L′ > (L + l) qubits
to Bob. The efficiency is
η =
L
(L+ l)
< 100%. (11)
In the previous protocol, the optimal efficiency is η′ = L/2(L+ l) < 50%. Obviously,
when the lossing qubits are same, η > η′. From Eq.(11), we see as l → 0 η → 100%, it
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means that an ideal unsymmetrical GHZ protocol corresponds to the 100% efficiency. It
need to stress that here the discard particles are the same as BB84 protocol for obtaining
a L qubits because the particle P3 is finally discard in our scheme.
Let us now consider the security of this protocol. It is warranted by the correlation of
the GHZ triplet state. From the table I it is clear that even if the eavesdropper knows what
measurements Alice and Bob made (that is, x or y) on particles P1, P2, P3, she can only
determine whether their results are the same or opposite and also that the eavesdropper
will gain no knowledge of what Alice’s and Bob’s actually are, because the eavesdropper
will has the probability of 1/2 of making a mistake. In fact, the eavesdropper can not
gain any knowledge from Alice even if the measurement bases, she can only obtain the
Bob’s measurement bases that is public. By this knowledge, the eavesdropper can not
obtain the useful information from Alice and Bob’s sharing key.
The eavesdropper can not succeed to obtain the key by the intercept/resend attack
defined in [9]. Suppose that the eavesdropper has managed to get a hold of Alice and Bob’s
key, she then intercepts Bob’s particle P2 and send another particle P
∗
2
to Bob. In this
case, Alice’s and the eavesdropper’s three particles construct a GHZ triplet. Eavesdropper
can not obtain the key, because the Alice’s and Bob’s particles are not a GHZ triplet,
there are no correlated or anticorrelated result, eavesdropper’s interception will introduce
error and can be detected by Alice and Bob.
The entanglement attacks is no use in our protocol. To show that, Let us assume that
the eavesdropper has been able to entangle an ancilla in state |A〉 with the GHZ triplet
state that Alice and Bob are using. The state describing the state of the GHZ triplet and
the ancilla is
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|z + z + z+〉 + |z − z − z−〉)⊗ |A〉. (12)
By using the x and y eigenstates and Eq.(7), The eavesdropper get
U |Ψ〉 = 1
2
(|x+ x+〉 ⊗ |x+〉 ⊗ |A1〉+ |x− x−〉 ⊗ |x+〉 ⊗ |A2〉
+|x+ x−〉 ⊗ |x−〉 ⊗ |A3〉+ |x− x+〉 ⊗ |x−〉 ⊗ |A4〉).
(13)
where U denote the unitary transformation. By projecting the above state onto |φ〉 =
α1|x+ x+〉+ α2|x− x−〉+ α3|x+ x−〉+ α4|x− x+〉, the eavesdropper creates the states
|Ψ〉E = 1
2
(|x+〉 ⊗ (α∗
1
|A1〉+ α∗2|A2〉) + |x−〉 ⊗ (α∗3|A3〉+ α∗4|A4〉)). (14)
If the eavesdropper can gain the Bob’s qubits, she can obtain the key. However, Eq.(14)
shows that the eavesdropper can not obtain Bob’s results. By the similar method, the
eavesdropper can not obtain the Bob’s qubits when Alice’s and Bob’s states satify Eqs.(8-
10).
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There is an additional points to notice here. Like all the previous schemes, our scheme
itself can also not prevent the men-in-middle attack. The men-in-middle attack may
be described as follows: When the legitimate communicator Alice communicates the
legitimate communicator Bob, Eve intercepts all qubit sent by Alice, and communicates
Bob with impersonating Alice. Finally, Eve obtains two keys KAE, KEB, where KAE
represents the secret key between Alice and eavesdropper, and KAE represents the secret
key between Bob and eavesdropper. As a result eavesdropper can easily decrypt the
ciphertext sent by Alice or Bob. To prevent the men-in-middle attack, Alice and Bob
may verify their identity by using the identity verification technologies [15]. This method
need to share a aforehand key between Alice and Bob, the verification proceeding is similar
to that presented in [15].
In conclusions, I propose a quantum key distribution protocol based on the GHZ
triplet states, the security is warranted by the correlation of the GHZ triplet states. This
protocol is unsymmetrical because Alice has two particles and Bob only has one particle
from the GHZ triplet. The unsymmetrical characteristic let the proposed protocol have
the following merits. 1) The efficiency of the quantum key distribution is excellent, it
approaches 100%. This will be very useful in the practical application. 2) The security is
higher than the previous protocol, because Alice’s bases for the quantum key are secret
and Alice’s and Bob’s bases are unsymmetrical.
I wish to thank Professor G. Guo and Dr. Z. Wang for their useful discussion on the
GHZ states. This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China, Grants No. 69803008.
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